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Reports of changes in experiences of body location and ownership following synchronous 2 
tactile and visual stimulation of fake and real hands (rubber hand effects) are widely 3 
attributed to multisensory integration mechanisms. However, existing control methods for 4 
subjective report measures (asynchronous stroking and control statements) are confounded by 5 
participant hypothesis awareness; report may reflect response to demand characteristics. 6 
Subjective report is often accompanied by indirect (also called ‘objective’ or ‘implicit’) 7 
measures. Here we report tests of expectancies for synchronous ‘illusion’ and asynchronous 8 
‘control’ conditions across two pre-registered studies (n = 140 and n = 45) for two indirect 9 
measures: proprioceptive drift (a change in perceived hand location) and skin conductance 10 
response (SCR; a measure of physiological arousal). Expectancies for synchronous condition 11 
measures were greater than for asynchronous condition in both studies. Differences between 12 
synchronous and asynchronous control condition measures are therefore confounded by 13 
hypothesis awareness. Indirect measures of rubber hand effects may reflect compliance, bias 14 
and phenomenological control in response to demand characteristics. Valid control measures 15 
are required to support claims of a role of multisensory integration for both direct and indirect 16 
measures of rubber hand effects. 17 
  18 




Hypothesis awareness confounds asynchronous control conditions in indirect 2 
measures of the rubber hand illusion. 3 
Demand characteristics are cues which inform beliefs regarding experimental aims to 4 
participants and therefore influence experimental results (Orne, 1962). Such cues are not 5 
limited to experimental instruction but can arise from any aspect of the experimental 6 
situation, including the pre-existing beliefs of participants. Demand characteristics can lead to 7 
hypothesis awareness when participant expectancies match experimenters’ predictions. 8 
Hypothesis awareness effects include faking, and imagination which can generate false 9 
positives, but also reactance, which can lead to false negatives (see Corneille & Lush, 2021 10 
for a recent conceptual model of demand characteristics). A particular concern for rubber 11 
hand illusion measures is the possibility that they reflect implicit imaginative suggestion 12 
effects (Kirsch & Council, 1989; Michael et al., 2012) or ‘phenomenological control’ (see 13 
Dienes et al., 2020; Lush et al., 2020).  14 
Rubber hand (RH) effects involve experiences of ownership and feelings of 15 
mislocated touch when a fake hand (which is in view) and the participant’s own hand (which 16 
is hidden from view) are brushed in synchrony. Typically, these experiences are thought to be 17 
driven by multisensory integration mechanisms (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; see Riemer et al., 18 
2019 for a review). Proponents of this view generally refer to these effects as the rubber hand 19 
illusion. However, there are dissenting views. For example, Dieguez (2018) argued that the 20 
rubber hand illusion should not be considered an illusion in the same sense as classic visual 21 
or optical illusions, as it is likely to arise from participant expectancies (we agree, and 22 
henceforth employ inverted commas when referring to RH effects as illusions), and Alsmith 23 
(2015) argues that RH experience may reflect imaginative experiences. Consistent with these 24 
accounts, we have previously shown that demand characteristics are not controlled in 25 
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 4 
subjective report of RH effects (Lush, 2020), and that reports of RH experiences are 1 
substantially predicted by phenomenological control. For example, trait response to 2 
imaginative suggestion on a 6-point scale predicts subjective report of ownership experience 3 
on a 7-point scale by 0.8 units per scale point (Lush, Seth & Dienes, 2021; see also Lush et 4 
al., 2020; Roseboom & Lush, 2020). 5 
Here we present an investigation of the validity of RH effect control methods for two 6 
indirect or ‘implicit’ measures: proprioceptive drift (a reported shift in the perceived location 7 
of the participants own hand first reported by Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) and skin 8 
conductance response (changes in electrical properties of the skin which can accompany 9 
changes in arousal; e.g., Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Riemer et al., 2015). 10 
In RH research, subjective report is commonly measured by Likert scale responses to 11 
three statements describing referred touch and ownership experience, with agreement 12 
recorded on a 7-point scale from -3 to +3 (negative values indicate disagreement). These 13 
reports are generally taken after the induction procedure has ceased. A set of statements 14 
describing other experiences are often included as control statements. See Table 1 for 15 
statements and scale labels. Proprioceptive drift is typically measured by reports of the 16 
perceived position of the participant’s (unseen) hand before and after :the stroking procedure. 17 
See Riemer et al (2019) for a review of RH effect procedures.    18 
In addition to the experimental condition in which the brush strokes on the real and 19 
fake hands are performed in synchrony, an asynchronous condition in which there is a delay 20 
between visual and tactile stimulation is commonly employed as a control. For subjective RH 21 
report, we have shown that control statements and the asynchronous control condition are 22 
invalid controls because the differences between both ‘illusion’ and control statement 23 
response and synchronous and asynchronous condition response are confounded by 24 
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expectancies (Lush, 2020). By contrast with direct subjective reports of experience, 1 
proprioceptive drift and skin conductance are indirect measures of RH effects. Although 2 
these indirect measures are often described as ‘objective’ or ‘implicit’ measures, it is 3 
plausible that, like subjective report, they may be susceptible to demand characteristics. It is 4 
also common to employ an asynchronous control condition when interpreting indirect 5 
measures (see Riemer et al., 2019). An underlying assumption of an experimental control is 6 
that it holds everything constant except the independent variable relating to the mechanism of 7 
interest. In RH effect studies, the mechanism of interest is typically multisensory integration 8 
and the asynchronous control condition is intended keep all factors constant except for the 9 
timing of multisensory stimuli. However, participant expectancies may differ for these 10 
conditions. If so, this crucial assumption would be violated and the control procedure would 11 
not therefore be valid (because any difference between conditions may be attributable to a 12 
difference in expectancies instead of or in addition to differences in the timing of 13 
multisensory stimuli). It is therefore crucial to establish whether participants have differing 14 
expectancies for indirect measures in synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 15 
There is ongoing debate regarding the degree to which proprioceptive drift is related to 16 
subjective report of RH effects (see Riemer et al, 2019). There is evidence that proprioceptive 17 
drift can dissociate from subjective report (e.g., Rohde et al., 2011), and that it can occur in 18 
the asynchronous condition (e.g., Rohde et al., 2011; Tamè et al., 2018). However, it is a 19 
commonly referenced measure of RH effects (Google Scholar returns 1,420 results for 20 
“proprioceptive drift”, 09/04/2021), and is sometimes presented without any accompanying 21 
subjective report (e.g., Costantini & Haggard, 2007). Proprioceptive drift is generally 22 
considered an indirect measure because it requires no direct introspection regarding 23 
ownership or felt touch. Rather, it requires introspection regarding the perceived location of 24 
an unseen limb. In this way it is similar to indirect measures of response to imaginative 25 
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suggestion which involve report of perceived limb location following imaginative suggestion 1 
(e.g., that one’s hands are drawn together by a magnetic force; Bowers, 1993; Lush et al., 2 
2018). Like subjective report, proprioceptive drift is related to trait response to imaginative 3 
suggestion (e.g., Lush et al., 2020; Walsh et al., 2015). These relationships can be substantial; 4 
in a sample of 353 people, trait response to imaginative suggestions of a range of experiences 5 
(e.g., visual and auditory hallucinations) predicts a drift of 0.6 cm for each point on a 6 point 6 
scale of response to suggestion (Lush et al., 2020). In a previous investigation of demand 7 
characteristics in RH effects, Tamè et al. (2018) reported a weaker magnitude of drift (and 8 
subjective report) when participants were asked to report where their hand “really is” rather 9 
than where it “feels like” it is, and argued that proprioceptive drift may be attributable to 10 
demand characteristics. There are reports of proprioceptive drift in unimodal cases, for 11 
example, when a fake hand is merely viewed (Rohde et al., 2011) or when brushes are 12 
replaced with lasers (Durgin et al., 2007). Such cases have been interpreted as evidence for 13 
multi-modal integration effects either because imagined tactile experience is interpreted as a 14 
sensory modality (Durgin et al 2007) or because drift may reflect the integration of 15 
proprioceptive and visual information (Rohde et al, 2011). However, these interpretations 16 
also require ruling out the influence of demand characteristics. In an exploration of order 17 
effects, participants who underwent the asynchronous control condition before the 18 
synchronous condition reported a greater difference between synchronous and asynchronous 19 
conditions (Lush, 2021). This result may indicate hypothesis awareness arising from task 20 
order. Together, these observations are consistent with the proposal that proprioceptive drift 21 
may reflect effects driven by expectancies arising from demand characteristics.  22 
SCR is typically measured in RH studies by presenting a threat to the fake hand 23 
during or following induction, again controlled by comparison with an asynchronous stroking 24 
condition (e.g., Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). Although some RH researchers assert that 25 
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SCR cannot be voluntarily controlled, (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ma & Hommel, 1 
2013), there is a substantial body of research demonstrating voluntary control of SCR (e.g., 2 
Levenson et al., 1990; for a review see Yates, 1980) including in response to imaginative 3 
suggestion (across more than half a century, e.g., Barber & Coules, 1959; Kekecs et al., 4 
2016). Notably, changes in SCR occur when participants are prompted to imagine that virtual 5 
arms presented on a screen are their own (Hägni et al., 2008). As with proprioceptive drift, 6 
these observations suggest that SCR may be sensitive to demand characteristics.  7 
Here, in two pre-registered studies, we replicate previous results showing 8 
expectancies for subjective report of RH effects differ for synchronous and asynchronous 9 
conditions (Lush, 2020) and extend investigation of expectancies for synchronous and 10 
asynchronous conditions to the indirect RH effect measures of proprioceptive drift and SCR. 11 
As Orne (1969) noted, expectancy studies (or “pre-experimental enquiries’) can never 12 
provide evidence that a given effect is attributable to demand characteristics. Rather they test 13 
the adequacy of an experimental procedure for controlling the effects of demand 14 
characteristics. If an experimental procedure is inadequate for controlling, for example, 15 
hypothesis awareness, it follows that hypothesis awareness effects cannot be ruled out for 16 
studies which employ that procedure. If participant expectancies for synchronous and 17 
asynchronous conditions differ in the direction reported in RH experiments, any difference in 18 
these measures may be attributable to demand characteristics and consequently, existing 19 
reports of proprioceptive drift and SCR may reflect phenomenological control (or other 20 
hypothesis awareness effects including imagination and faking; see Corneille & Lush, 2021) 21 
rather than, or in addition to, multisensory processes. This would have major implications for 22 
interpretation of existing reports of these effects because we would be unable to disentangle 23 
hypothesis awareness effects from other effects in any given case. 24 
25 
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Study 1: Proprioceptive drift expectancies 1 
Method 2 
Participants  3 
Data from 172 participants were recorded. 31 Participants were undergraduate 4 
Psychology students recruited from the University of Sussex recruitment database and 141 5 
were current UK psychology undergraduates fluent in English recruited on Prolific 6 
(https://www.prolific.co/). Sussex participants were compensated with course credit. Prolific 7 
participants were compensated with payment of £1.50. In accordance with pre-registered 8 
exclusion criteria (preregistration document available at https://osf.io/9c8mq), 32 participants 9 
were excluded, 17 for spending less than ten seconds reading the information page and 15 for 10 
reporting previous participation in a procedure similar to that shown in the video. Because 11 
Bayes factors for each pre-registered analysis were greater than the preregistered stopping 12 
rule threshold (greater than 6 or less than 1/6), data collection ceased before data from 200 13 
participants had been collected. Data from 140 participants (106 female, 34 male) with a 14 
mean age of 24.1 (SD = 6.8) were therefore included. For a preregistered subgroup analysis, 15 
67 participants who reported having heard of the procedure before were further excluded, 16 
leaving 73 participants (56 female, 17 male) with a mean age of 24.6 (SD = 7.6). All 17 
participants provided informed consent and ethical approval was granted by the University of 18 
Sussex ethics committee.  19 
 20 
Procedure (adapted from Lush, 2020) 21 
All study materials are available at https://osf.io/ct7qe/. Participants completed the 22 
study online using their own computers. After providing consent and demographic 23 
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information, participants were asked to read the following short passage describing the RH 1 
procedure: 2 
“In this procedure, a participant’s own hand is hidden from their view and a fake hand 3 
is placed in front of them. An experimenter then uses brushes to stroke the 4 
participants hidden real hand and the visible fake hand. The location of the brush 5 
strokes on the real and fake hands is matched, so that a downward brush stroke on the 6 
participants index finger will be accompanied by a downward brush stroke on the fake 7 
hand. Participants can therefore see a paintbrush brushing down the finger on a fake 8 
hand while they feel a paintbrush brushing down the finger on their real hand (which 9 
they cannot see). There are two conditions in the experimental 10 
procedure: Synchronous condition: The brush strokes on the real hand and on the 11 
fake hand occur at the same time (they are synchronous). Asynchronous 12 
condition: The brush strokes on the participants real hand and on the fake hand occur 13 
at different times (they are asynchronous)” 14 
Participants were then shown a 62 second video in which the synchronous and 15 
asynchronous procedures were demonstrated. This was followed by a brief passage of text 16 
describing the procedures shown in the video: 17 
  “In the video, an experimenter performed brush strokes on the participant’s 18 
hand and a fake hand in matching locations (the index fingers) on each hand. The 19 
participant could see the fake hand but could not see their real hand. There were two 20 
conditions. In the synchronous condition, the brush strokes on the real and fake hands 21 
occurred at the same time. In the asynchronous condition there was a delay between 22 
the brush strokes on the fake hand and the real hand.” 23 
 Participants were then asked to briefly answer the following question which was 24 
intended to provoke consideration of the previously presented information: “What do you 25 
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think this procedure is supposed to cause (what is the participant expected to experience)?” 1 
and asked whether or not they had heard of the procedure before and whether or not they had 2 
previously participated in an experiment in which the procedure was used.  3 
The following was added to the procedure reported in Lush (2020) to measure 4 
proprioceptive drift expectancies. A figure illustrating a birds-eye view of the experimental 5 
set-up was displayed with a legend describing a setup for proprioceptive drift measurement 6 
(Figure 1; based on the procedure in Botan et al., 2018 and Lush et al, 2020)). 7 
 8 
Figure 1. Illustration provided to participants. The figure was accompanied by the 9 
following legend: The rubber hand (1) is positioned to the left of the participant's hand (2). 10 
The participant cannot see their own right hand (2), which is inside the box (dashed line). The 11 
participant can see the rubber hand (1) through a window in the box. The index finger of the 12 
rubber hand (1) is positioned 15 cm to the left of the participant's right index finger (2). The 13 
edge of the box (3) is 15 cm to the right of the participant's right index finger. 14 
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Participants then read the following description of a proprioceptive drift measurement 1 
procedure in which estimates of the position of the participant’s hand are recorded before 2 
brush stroking and following brush stroking in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions:  3 
 4 
“At the beginning of the experiment, the participant cannot see their own right hand 5 
or the fake hand. The experimenter then places a long ruler horizontally across the 6 
box and asks the participant to use their left hand to point to the position on the ruler 7 
which is directly above their right index finger (which is hidden inside the box). 8 
  9 
The experimenter then removes the cover from the box so the participant can see the 10 
fake hand and asks them to focus on the fake hand. The experimenter then performs 11 
the procedure shown in the video (strokes the participant's hand and the fake hand 12 
either synchronously or asynchronously). 13 
  14 
After 1 minute of the brush stroking procedure, the experimenter covers the hole on 15 
the box so that the participant can no longer see the fake hand and asks them to keep 16 
their right hand still inside the box. The experimenter once again places the ruler 17 
across the box and asks the participant to use their left hand to point to the position on 18 
the ruler which is directly above their right index finger (which is hidden in the box).  19 
 20 
Note that the participant's own hand is not visible at any point (it remains concealed 21 
inside the box).” 22 
 23 
This was followed by a free report question which was again intended to provoke 24 
consideration of the presented material: “Why do you think the experimenter asks the 25 
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participant to estimate the location of their right index finger before and after the 1 
procedure?”. 2 
To record expectancies for perceived hand position at baseline (before stroking) and 3 
following synchronous and asynchronous stroking conditions, participants used a horizontal 4 
slider labelled from -15 cm to +15 cm to report where they think they would judge their index 5 
finger to be if they were a participant in the described experiment. They were informed that 6 
15 cm represents the position of the fake hand, 0 cm the actual position of the participant's 7 
index finger inside the box and -15 cm the edge of the box (away from the rubber hand). 8 
Participants were asked to use the slider to report “where you think you would judge your 9 
index finger to be if you were a participant in this procedure”. Judgements for baseline 10 
(before stroking) and following synchronous and asynchronous brush stroking were recorded 11 
on subsequent screens. 12 
Finally, participants reported expectancies for synchronous and asynchronous 13 
conditions for each of the 9 statements used in the original RH study, in fixed order (as in 14 
Lush, 2020). Table 1 shows the illusion and control statements taken from Botvinick and 15 
Cohen (1998) and the scale labels used to measure expectancies for each statement. The 16 
seven-item scale is taken from Lush et al., (2019) and is based on the seven point scale which 17 
measures agreement and disagreement with RH effect statements introduced by Botvinick 18 
and Cohen (1998).   19 
 20 
Measures  21 
A proprioceptive drift expectancy measure was calculated for synchronous and 22 
asynchronous conditions from the difference between baseline judgement and synchronous or 23 
asynchronous condition judgements. 24 
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Response to the three ‘illusion’ statement expectancies (S1-S3) was used to calculate 1 
a mean ‘illusion’ expectancy score for both synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 2 
Response to the six ‘control’ statements (C1-C6) was used to calculate a mean ‘control’ 3 
expectancy score for the synchronous condition. 4 
 5 
Preregistered Analyses  6 
Study 1 Analyses are preregistered at https://osf.io/98xyh. Differences between 7 
synchronous condition and asynchronous condition expectancies in the full sample and in a 8 
subsample of participants who reported that they had not heard of the procedure were 9 
analysed with t-tests. For proprioceptive drift expectancies, Bayes factors were calculated 10 
with H1 modelled by a half normal based on the 1 cm difference in proprioceptive drift 11 
between synchronous and asynchronous induction reported in Botan et al (2018) and as in 12 
Lush et al, 2020. For subjective report, Bayes factors were calculated as in Lush 2020, using 13 
a half normal based on the 1 scale point difference in expectancy between synchronous and 14 
asynchronous induction reported in Lush et al. (2020). 95% CIs (interpreted as Bayesian 15 
credibility intervals with a uniform prior) were used to estimate measures. Bayes factors were 16 
calculated with the calculator at: https://harry-tattan-birch.shinyapps.io/bayes-factor-17 
calculator/.  Robustness Regions (RR) were determined as the set of scale factors that led to 18 
the same qualitative conclusion (either B > 3, or B < 1/3; or 1/3 < B < 3; Dienes, 2019). 19 
Bayes factors were used to assess strength of evidence for H1 versus H0 after the first 20 
20 participants (following exclusion) and data collection ceased when evidence was sensitive 21 
in either direction (Bayes factor of greater than 6 or less than 1/6). 22 
 23 
 24 




In the whole sample, expected proprioceptive drift was higher for the synchronous 2 
condition (M = 4.5 cm, SD = 6.0) than for the asynchronous condition (M = 1.7 cm, SD = 3 
6.1), t(139) = 5.62, p <.001, 95% CI [1.9, 3.9], d = .48 95% CI [.30, .65], BH(0,1) = 2.39 x 105 4 
RRB>3 [.1, >30]. 5 
 6 
 7 
Figure 2. Mean proprioceptive drift expectancies for synchronous and asynchronous 8 
conditions. Error bars show 95% CIs. 9 
 10 
Replicating previous results (Lush, 2020), synchronous condition illusion (S1-S3) 11 
expectancies (M = 1.7, SD = 1.0) were higher than for the asynchronous condition (M = 0.2, 12 
SD = 1.2), t(139) = 11.91, p < .001, 95% CI [1.3, 1.8],  d = 1.01 95% CI [.81, 1.21], BH(0,1)  = 13 
9.78 x 1028 RRB>3  [.02, >6]. Synchronous condition illusion expectancies were also higher 14 
than synchronous condition control (C1-C6) statement expectancies, (M = 0.1, SD = 1.1), 15 
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t(139) = 15.6, p < .001, 95% CI [1.4, 1.8],  d = 1.32 95% CI [1.09, 1.55], BH(0,1)  9.37 x 1029 1 
RRB>3  [<.01, >6]. 2 
 3 
Figure 3a. Subjective report expectancies for mean illusion (S1-S3) and control (C1-C6) 4 
statements for synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Error bars show 95% CIs. 5 
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  1 
Figure 3b. Subjective report expectancies for individual statements for synchronous and 2 
asynchronous conditions. Error bars show 95% CIs. 3 
 4 
In participants who reported not having heard of the presented RH procedure, 5 
expected proprioceptive drift was higher in synchronous (M = 3.7 cm, SD = 7.2) than 6 
asynchronous condition (M = 1.7 cm, SD = 7.0). t(72) = 2.80, p = .007 95% CI 0[.6, 3.5], d = 7 
.33 95% CI [.09, .56], BH(0,1). 14.91 RRB>3 [.33, 24.0]. 8 
Synchronous illusion expectancy rating (M = 1.7, SD = 0.90) was greater than async 9 
illusion expectancy rating (M = 0.2, SD = 1.2) in participants who reported no experience of 10 
the illusion, t(72) = 8.49, p < .001, 95% CI [1.2, 1.9], d = .99 [.71, 1.27], BH(0,1)  1.43 x 1014 11 
RRB>3  [.03, >6]. Synchronous illusion expectancy rating was also greater than synchronous 12 
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control expectancy rating (M = 02, SD = 1.0) in this subgroup., t(72) = 12.06, p < .001, 95% 1 
CI [1.2, 1.7], d = 1.41 [1.08, 1.73], BH(0,1).= 5.97 x 1029 RRB>3  [.02, >6].   2 
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Study 2: Skin conductance response (SCR) expectancies 1 
A second study was conducted to test expectancies for skin conductance response. We 2 
predicted that participants would estimate measures of physiological signals to be greater in 3 
the synchronous than asynchronous condition.  4 
Method 5 
Participants 6 
50 participants fluent in English and resident in the UK were recruited using Prolific 7 
(https://www.prolific.co/). Five participants were excluded according to preregistered criteria:  8 
one for spending less than an average of four seconds on the nine agreement statements 9 
reports, two for spending less than 10 seconds on the information page and two for reporting 10 
previous participation in a RH study. Data from 45 participants (12 male, 33 female) with a 11 
mean age of 32.0 (SD = 13.0) were therefore analysed. For preregistered subgroup analyses, 12 
33 participants who reported not having heard of the procedure were included (24 female, 9 13 
male) with a mean age of 33.8 (SD = 13.6). For exploratory sub-group analyses, data from 31 14 
participants who reported not having studied Psychology at degree level and not having heard 15 
of the procedure were analysed (22 female, 9 male) with mean age 34.3 (SD = 13.8). 16 
Procedure 17 
The procedure replicated Study 1, with three additional questions. First, participants 18 
were asked whether or not they are currently studying for or have completed a degree in 19 
Psychology. Second, they were asked to provide a free report regarding what they thought 20 
would be measured by electrodes attached to their hand during the brush stroking procedure 21 
(see following section). Finally, they were asked to report whether they thought the 22 
experimenter would expect higher measurements from the electrodes for synchronous than 23 
asynchronous conditions. Material regarding skin conductance was presented after 24 
proprioceptive drift and subjective report expectancies had been recorded. 25 




The study materials for measuring proprioceptive drift and subjective report 2 
expectancies were as in Study 1. For skin conductance expectancies, participants were 3 
presented with the following text: 4 
“Before the procedure, electrodes are attached to your left hand and connected to a 5 
computer. During the procedure a second experimenter suddenly stabs the rubber hand with a 6 
knife.” 7 
They were then asked to provide free response to the question “What do you think is 8 
being measured by the electrodes?”. Finally they were asked to report whether they thought 9 
the experimenter expects this measurement to be greater in the synchronous or asynchronous 10 
condition.  11 
Measures 12 
In accordance with preregistered criteria, only participants who gave free responses 13 
related to changes in an emotional state (fear or nervous reaction) or a physiological state 14 
(e.g., sweat, pulse) relating to fear or nervous reaction were included in SCR expectancy 15 
analysis. These criteria were chosen because SCR is considered to indirectly reflect changes 16 
in emotional states and is sensitive to physiological change. The number of correct and 17 
incorrect answers were independently assessed by two experimenters. Analyses are presented 18 
for each of the two raters (PL and ZD) and for the full sample. 19 
Preregistered analyses 20 
 Analyses are preregistered at https://osf.io/tm6aw. Analyses for proprioceptive drift 21 
and subjective report expectancies were as in Study 1. For SCR, as preregistered, we 22 
estimated the proportion of correct and incorrect answers to the question regarding what the 23 
experimenter expects for SCR with a 95% credibility interval calculated using the Keisan 24 
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Online Calculator at https://keisan.casio.com/exec/system/1180573226. A Bayes factor 1 
modelled with a Bernouilli likelihood with prior beta(1,1) and posterior distribution 2 
beta(1+c,1+i), with (c) number of correct answers and (i) number of incorrect answers (the 3 
prior is a uniform using a Beta distribution, the standard distribution for estimation in a 4 
binomial situation, e.g.  Kruschke & Liddell, 2018).  Participants also reported whether they 5 
expect this measure to be greater following synchronous or asynchronous stroking. A Bayes 6 
factor was calculated for the hypothesis that synchronous condition will be chosen with 7 
greater frequency than asynchronous condition based on the posterior beta(1+s, 1+a), with (s) 8 
the number saying synchronous, and (a) the number saying asynchronous. The Bayes factor 9 
is the area of the posterior above 0.5, divided by the area below 0.5. This first Bayes factor 10 
presumes there is an effect and tests which direction it goes in. A second Bayes factor was 11 
calculated to test for the predicted effect versus H0. This was calculated using the Rouder 12 
binomial calculator at http://pcl.missouri.edu/bf-binomial with H1 modelled as a beta(20,10) 13 
because this puts almost all mass above 0.5 (see Dienes, 2015, Appendix 12.2).  14 
 15 
Exploratory analyses 16 
To investigate whether or not expectancy effects are also seen in people who have not 17 
had training in the design of psychological experiments, participants were asked whether or 18 
not they had degree level training in Psychology and their responses used to identify a 19 
subgroup of participants without such training for t-test analysis of drift and subjective report 20 
expectancies.  21 
To investigate whether a ‘control’ expectancy statement (which involves an 22 
experience of drifting toward the hand) was greater when preceded by judgements of 23 
expected perceived hand position, we compared mean C1 synchronous condition 24 
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expectancies in the combined data from Study 1 and Study 2 (n = 185) and data from Lush 1 
(2020), in which proprioceptive drift expectancies were not measured (n = 24). 2 
Bayes factors for exploratory analyses were modelled as for preregistered analyses. 3 
Data, analysis files and analysis output (including boxplots and violin plots) are available at 4 
https://osf.io/ct7qe/. 5 
6 




Figure 4 shows proprioceptive drift expectancy ratings for synchronous and 2 
asynchronous conditions. Replicating Study 1, proprioceptive drift expectancy was greater 3 
for the synchronous condition (M = 5.5 cm, SD = 7.8cm) than for the asynchronous condition 4 
(M = 0.8 cm, SD = 5.5 cm), t(44)= 4.61, p<.001, 95% CI [2.7, 6.8], d = .69 95% CI [.36, 5 
1.01], BH(0,1) = 234.43 RRB>3 [.26, >30].  6 
 7 
Figure 4. Mean proprioceptive drift expectancies for synchronous and asynchronous 8 
conditions. Error bars show 95% CIs. 9 
 10 
Figure 5a shows mean illusion and control statement expectancy ratings for 11 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions and Figure 5b shows expectancies for individual 12 
statements. As in Study 1 and in Lush (2020), ‘Illusion’ expectancy ratings were greater for 13 
the synchronous condition (M = 1.4, SD = 1.3) than for the asynchronous condition (M = 0.1, 14 
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SD = 1.3), t(44) = 5.26, 95% CI [0.8, 1.7], d = .79 95% CI [.45, 1.12], BH(0,1)  = 2.13 x 105 1 
RRB>3  [.06, > 6]. Synchronous condition ‘illusion’ expectancy ratings were also greater than 2 
synchronous condition control statement expectancy ratings (M = 0.3, SD = 1.0), t(44) = 6.11, 3 
p <.001, 95% CI [0.7, 1.4],  d = .91 95% CI [.56, 1.26], BH(0,1)  = 1.88 x 107 RRB>3 [.04, > 6]. 4 
 5 
Figure 5a. Subjective report expectancies for mean illusion (S1-S3) and control (C1-C6) 6 
statements for synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Error bars show 95% CIs. 7 




Figure 5b. Subjective report expectancies for individual statements for synchronous and 2 
asynchronous conditions. Error bars show 95% CIs. 3 
 4 
 5 
Replicating Study 1 results, in the 33 participants who reported not having heard of 6 
the procedure previously, proprioceptive drift expectancy was greater for the synchronous 7 
condition (M = 4.8 cm, SD = 8.5) than for the asynchronous condition (M = 0.4 cm, SD = 8 
5.9), t (32) = 3.78, p <.001, 95% CI [2.0, 6.1], d = .66 95% CI [.28, 1.03],  BH(0,1)  = 30.76. 9 
RRB>3  [.36, >30]. 10 
 Illusion expectancy ratings were greater for the synchronous condition (M = 1.1, SD 11 
= 1.4) than for the asynchronous condition (M = -0.1, SD = 1.2), t(32) = 4.54, p < .001, 95% 12 
CI [0.7, 1.8], d = .79 95% CI [.39, 1.18], BH(0,1)  = 8284.27 RRB>3 [.07, >30]. Synchronous 13 
illusion expectancy ratings were also greater than synchronous control statement expectancy 14 
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ratings (M = 0.2, SD = 0.9), t(32) = 4.60, p< .001 95% CI [0.5, 1.4], d = .80 95% CI [.40, 1 
1.19] . BH(0,1)  =  9141.29 RRB>3  [.06, >30]. 2 
For the first rater, 25 participants (55.6%) were classified as giving correct answers 3 
for the skin conductance question. Of these, 23 thought the experimenter would expect a 4 
greater measure in the synchronous condition, compared to two in the asynchronous 5 
condition. The proportion reporting synchronous was therefore 0.92 95% CI  [.75, .97]. The 6 
Bayes factor testing for the direction of the effect assuming there was some effect was 7 
BU[0.5,1] vs U{0, 0.5]) = 190838.69 in favour of more people thinking the effect would be greater 8 
in the synchronous than asynchronous direction. The Bayes factor testing this directional 9 
effect against H0 was BB(20,10) = 1632.85 in favour of the effect.  10 
The second rater interpreted the criteria more liberally and classified 37 participants’ 11 
(82%) free responses as correct. Of these, 34 reported synchronous and 3 asynchronous as the 12 
condition they expected the measure to be greater for. The proportion reporting synchronous 13 
was therefore 0.92 95% CI [.79, .97]. The Bayes factor testing for the direction of the effect 14 
assuming there was some effect was BU[0.5,1] vs U{0, 0.5]) = 2.99 x 107 in favour of more people 15 
thinking the effect would be greater in the synchronous than asynchronous direction. The 16 
Bayes factor testing this directional effect against H0 was BB(20,10) = 1.03 x 105 in favour of 17 
the effect.  18 
In the whole sample 41 participants expected a greater SCR effect in the synchronous 19 
condition and 4 in the synchronous condition. The proportion reporting synchronous was 20 
therefore .91, 95% CI [.79, .96]. The Bayes factor testing for the direction of the effect 21 
assuming there was some effect was BU[0.5,1] vs U{0, 0.5]) = 3.92x108 in favour of more people 22 
thinking the effect would be greater in the synchronous than asynchronous direction. The 23 
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Bayes factor testing this directional effect against H0 was BB(20,10) = 1.10x106 in favour of the 1 
effect.  2 
Exploratory results 3 
In the 31 participants who reported both never having studied Psychology at degree 4 
level and also never having heard of the presented procedure, synchronous condition drift 5 
expectancy ratings (M = 4.5 cm, SD = 8.6) were greater than asynchronous drift expectancy 6 
ratings (M = 0.3, SD = 6.1) t(30) = 3.46 95% CI [1.7, 6.7] p = .002 d= .62 95% CI [.23, 1.00]. 7 
BH(0,1)  =  18.67 RR [.40, >30] 8 
Illusion expectancy ratings for synchrony (M = 1.1, SD = 1.4) were greater than for 9 
asynchrony (M = -.1, SD = 1.2), t(30) = 4.33, p < .001, 95% CI [.6, 1.8],  d = .78 95% 95% CI 10 
[.37, 1.18] BH(0,1)  = 884.90 RRB>3 [.09, >6]. Synchronous condition illusion expectancy 11 
ratings were also greater than synchronous condition control ratings (M = 0.1, SD = 1.0), t(30 12 
= 4.67, p < .001, 95% CI [0.6, 1.5], d = .84 95% CI .42, 1.24], BH(0,1)  = 6.51  x 104  RRB>3 13 
[.05, >6]. 14 
In Study 1 and Study 2, subjective report expectancies were recorded after the 15 
proprioceptive drift procedure, which may have driven expectancies for this statement. Figure 16 
6 shows response to C1 in combined data from Studies 1 and 2 alongside data from Lush 17 
(2020) in which there was no proprioceptive drift expectancy procedure. Synchronous 18 
condition C1 ‘control’ statement expectancies were greater when proprioceptive drift 19 
expectancies were measured (M = 1.1, SD = 1.4) than when they were not (M = 0.1, SD = 20 
1.6), t(29.22) = 3.67, p < .001, 95% CI [.5, 1.9],  d = .84 95% 95% CI [.37, 1.30], BH(0,1)  = 21 
RRB>3 = 243.91[.11, >6]. 22 




Figure 6. Subjective report expectancies for statement C1 “It felt as if my (real) hand were 2 
drifting toward the rubber hand” in data from Lush (2020) in which proprioceptive drift 3 
expectancies were not measured and in combined data from Studies 1 and 2, in which 4 
proprioceptive drift expectancies were measured prior to subjective report expectancies. Error 5 
bars show 95% CIs.  6 
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General Discussion 1 
In two pre-registered studies, we found that participants reported greater expectancies 2 
for synchronous than asynchronous conditions for both indirect measures and subjective 3 
report of RH effects. These measures are generally claimed to demonstrate the surprising 4 
malleability of the sense of ownership of our own bodies and they support an extensive 5 
literature on embodiment (Braun et al., 2018; Riemer et al., 2019), but participant responses 6 
may be attributable to demand characteristics (see also Dieguez, 2018; Lush, 2020; Tamè et 7 
al., 2018). 8 
Hypothesis awareness can, of course, confound interpretation of measures. For 9 
hypothesis awareness to be controlled  (by any reasonable argument), expectancies must be 10 
matched across illusion and control conditions. Our results show that this is not the case for 11 
asynchronous stroking. We note that there have been attempts to replace or supplement 12 
asynchronous stroking as a control method. For example, the invisible hand illusion (in which 13 
there is no fake hand and empty space is ‘stroked’) was originally developed as a control, but 14 
was then interpreted as an experimental measure when the authors unexpectedly saw strong 15 
responses to it (Yong, 2013). Future control development requires careful consideration of 16 
expectancies prior to deciding on their interpretation. Note that, while controlling for 17 
expectancies may deal with confounds of bias and compliance, the consideration of 18 
phenomenological control requires an additional step – the control of suggestion difficulty 19 
(see Lush, 2020 for discussion of this issue). This is because even when expectancies are 20 
matched, differences between conditions may indicate differences in the ability to generate 21 
particular experiences. For effects for which hypothesis unawareness is unlikely (such as 22 
rubber hand effects), we have previously proposed a two stage development process for 23 
control methods (Lush, 2020). First, the control and experimental measures can be matched 24 
HYPOTHESIS AWARENESS CONFOUNDS INDIRECT RH MEASURES  
 
 29 
in expectancies using the kind of procedure reported here. Repeated testing and revision of 1 
candidate control statements, for example, might produce well matched expectancies within a 2 
few rounds of measurement (in different groups of participants). The second step is to match 3 
the difficulty of generating the experimental and control experiences by phenomenological 4 
control. For this, direct imaginative suggestion can be employed. For example, expectancies 5 
might be reasonably well matched for RH effects in response to brushing by a brush and by a 6 
laser light (as reported by Durgin et al, 2007). It may be that it is more difficult to generate an 7 
experience of touch felt on a fake hand when one’s own hand is not being touched (by 8 
anything other than light) and if so this would not be a good control for referred touch 9 
experience. However, it may be that it is as easy to generate an experience of ownership in 10 
response to laser stroking as brush stroking. Stroking with a (unimodal) laser light might 11 
therefore provide a good control for multisensory integration theories of ownership 12 
experience in which touch and vision are considered to jointly drive experience. If difficulty 13 
and expectancy are indeed matched, any ownership agreement for brush stroking over and 14 
above that seen for laser stroking could be attributed to multisensory integration processes. 15 
We note that mechanisms unrelated to demand characteristics might also drive laser light 16 
ownership effects, but establishing this would require the development of controls adequate 17 
to test the specific mechanism proposed in this case, too. We note that mechanisms unrelated 18 
to demand characteristics might also drive laser light ownership effects, but establishing this 19 
would require development of controls adequate to test the specific mechanism proposed in 20 
this case, too. 21 
Consistent with the proposal that proprioceptive drift reflects demand characteristics, 22 
Riemer et al. (2019) note the high variability of drift report, with reports varying from 1 cm 23 
to over 5 cm across studies. Riemer et al point out that report varies with different procedures 24 
(for example asking participants to point to where they think their hand is rather than verbally 25 
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report). This highlights the need to test expectancies for different measures. Such variation 1 
may arise from differing expectancies across experimental situations and different demand 2 
characteristics for different reporting methods Such variation may arise from differing 3 
expectancies across experimental situations and different demand characteristics for different 4 
reporting methods. Because most participants expected SCR measures to be greater in the 5 
synchronous than in the asynchronous condition,  reports of greater SCR in synchronous than 6 
asynchronous conditions may also reflect hypothesis awareness effects including faking (e.g., 7 
changing facial expression; Levenson et al., 1990),  imagination (e.g., simulating emotions; 8 
Stern & Lewis, 1968),  or phenomenological control (see Corneille & Lush, 2021; as 9 
mentioned previously, SCR effects have been demonstrated for direct imaginative suggestion 10 
of hand ownership experience; Hägni et al., 2008).. Altogether, claims that RH measures 11 
indicate an illusion which arises from multisensory integration rather than interpretative and 12 
creative experience (Lush et al., 2020; Dieguez, 2018; Alsmith, 2015) is not currently 13 
supported by evidence from any of subjective report, proprioceptive drift, or SCR measures, 14 
either individually or in combination. 15 
In addition to our pre-registered analyses of expectancies for proprioceptive drift and 16 
SCR, we conducted an exploratory analysis which further illustrates the influence of demand 17 
characteristics in RH effect expectancies. Specifically, expectancies for a control statement 18 
describing an experience of the participant’s hand drifting towards the rubber hand response 19 
were greater following measurement of expectancies regarding perceived hand location (as in 20 
the present experiments), than when there was no mention of hand location measurement (as 21 
was the case in Lush, 2020).  Botvinick & Cohen (1998) did not measure drift before 22 
subjective report and also do not report strong agreement for this control statement. It is 23 
plausible that, if in the original study drift had been measured prior to subjective report, this 24 
standard control statement would instead be considered a measure of the illusion.  25 
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While the present results are confined to the rubber hand paradigm, there are many 1 
extensions of this paradigm in which attempts to control demand characteristics also make 2 
use of an asynchronous condition. For example, in full body illusions (e.g., Lenggenhager et 3 
al., 2007) or ‘enfacement’ (experiences of ownership of and touch referred to another’s face 4 
e.g., Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012). It is not safe to assume that comparison with 5 
asynchronous control conditions is not confounded in these situations either. Measures of the 6 
Pinocchio illusion, in which an experience of an elongating nose occurs following stimulation 7 
of the bicep while the finger is touching the nose may be attributable to demand 8 
characteristics and trait differences in susceptibility to ‘perceptual anomalies’ (Purcell et al., 9 
2020). Measures of experimentally induced body ‘illusions’, beyond the rubber hand effect, 10 
therefore require the development of valid controls for demand characteristics and 11 
consideration of the influence of trait differences in phenomenological control which are not 12 
directly related to embodiment. 13 
There are other indirect measures of RH effects which we have not addressed here. For 14 
example, the cross-modal congruency effect in which the participants are asked to report 15 
which of two fingers on their own hand has received tactile stimulation while a light is 16 
presented on the rubber hand so that its location is congruent or incongruent with the 17 
stimulated finger (Zopf et al., 2013). The difference in reaction time between congruent and 18 
incongruent trials greater for synchronous than asynchronous RH induction. However, 19 
differing expectancies may play a role here too. It has been shown that imagining 20 
counterfactual scenarios can change conflict control (for example, imagining words are 21 
meaningless in a Stroop task substantially reduces Stroop interference; Palfi et al., 2021). 22 
Therefore, it is possible that RH cross-modal congruency effects may arise from imagining 23 
the fake hand is your own hand in the synchronous condition, but not in the asynchronous 24 
condition. 25 
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Note that other recent methods (e.g., 2AFC; Chancel et al., 2021) may also reflect expectancy 1 
effects;  a participant who expects to experience an effect for synchronous and not 2 
asynchronous stroking can be expected to respond affirmatively when asked if they 3 
experience ownership when multisensory signals are relatively synchronous and negatively 4 
when they are less synchronous (participant hypothesis awareness in the Chancel et al study 5 
was likely, given pre-screening for report of RH effects). Reducing the possible response to 6 
two forced choices (i.e., yes and no) offers no protection against hypothesis awareness in RH 7 
effects (see also Lush et al., 2021; Seth et al., 2021). 8 
Individual differences in the tendency to respond to demand characteristics has been 9 
underexplored. Research into this question requires consideration of various aspects of 10 
demand characteristics (Lush & Cornielle, 2021). For example, children may be less likely to 11 
form accurate hypothesis awareness, but more likely to react to hypothesis awareness or 12 
(hypothesis-mistaken beliefs) with a particular effect (e.g., imagination or phenomenological 13 
control).  This is a relevant consideration for RH effects, which are often studied in children 14 
(Lee, Ma & Kammers, 2021). Children have been shown to respond to imaginative 15 
suggestion to a greater degree than adults (e.g., Barber & Calverley,1963) and so in the 16 
presence of hypothesis awareness, children might be expected to exhibit stronger 17 
phenomenological control effects than adults. It seems reasonable also to assume imaginative 18 
response to be relatively high in children. As for faking, Brenner (2000) argues that, because 19 
children as young as four can show awareness of faking emotion, faking cannot be ruled out 20 
in mood induction studies of young children. If children are aware that a given response 21 
could be faked, it seems plausible that some may fake that response. As a side note, the use of 22 
‘implicit’ to describe indirect measures can lead to misinterpretation beyond unsafe 23 
assumptions that indirect measures are resistant to demand characteristics. For example, in 24 
sense of agency research, intentional binding (an indirect measure of sense of agency) is 25 
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often misinterpreted as a measure of implicit sense of agency. It is a small step from 1 
describing something as an implicit method to describing it as a measure of something 2 
implicit, but the meanings are very different. We recommend the term ‘indirect’ rather than 3 
‘implicit’ to reduce the risk of such errors. The present study illustrates that indirect measures 4 
are not necessarily any less vulnerable to demand characteristics than direct subjective report. 5 
In summary, comparison of synchronous and asynchronous conditions in RH effects is 6 
confounded by hypothesis awareness. As with subjective reports of experience of referred 7 
touch and ownership of a fake hand (Lush, 2020), indirect measures of response to 8 
synchronous brush stroking of fake and real hands may reflect compliance, bias and 9 
phenomenological control effects rather than (or in addition to) multisensory integration 10 
mechanisms.   11 
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